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I. Introduction: Morality and International Trade
Many foreign policymakers have a deep-rooted and long-
standing belief that it is inappropriate and perhaps even dangerous
for nations to pursue moral objectives such as human rights.
According to this view, because such pursuits expose altruistic
nations to exploitation by powerful states acting purely in their
own self-interest, "states cannot afford to be moral."' Although,
t Associate Professor, Rutgers Business School. A.B., Oberlin College; J.D.,
New York University School of Law; Ph.D., Harvard University. I wish to
thank Rutgers Ph.D. student Miguel Alzola for his very able research assistance.
Funding was provided by the Rutgers Business School Research Resources
Committee. I am also grateful for the comments of my colleagues in the
Rutgers Interdisciplinary Working Group on Foundations of International Trade
and Foreign Direct Investment, particularly Claire Dickerson, Wayne Eastman,
Anna Gelpern, Kevin Kolben, Susan Feinberg, Mariana Spatarenu, David
Bensman, and Nicolas Dahan.
I Robert J. Art & Kenneth Waltz, Technology, Strategy and the Uses of
Force, in THE USE OF FORCE 6 (Robert J. Art & N. Waltz eds., 1983). Realism,
the doctrine from which this belief stems, has classical roots dating back to
Thucydides. Id. However, the contemporary influence of realism originates
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from a "realist" perspective, it is imprudent to pursue moral
instead of more conventional objectives such as economic gain
and military advantage, the use of moral persuasion to advance
Realpolitik2 concerns is not at all problematic. One can argue that
the most effectiv& way to achieve global action and change is by
combining force or economic pressure with compelling moral
arguments that win over the hearts and minds of people of all
nations.
The major developments in intellectual property (IP) rules
over the past two decades illustrate the significant role moral
suasion plays in global affairs. At two critical junctures in
particular, moral arguments were decisive factors in negotiation
breakthroughs and legal transformation. During the debates
preceding the founding of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
in 1995, IP became a part of trade law for the first time in history,
representing a clear victory for rich nations and large multinational
corporations.3 The second instance of morality playing a key role
occurred when poorer third world countries won important
concessions mollifying some of the more regressive aspects of the
WTO's IP regime in the 2002 Doha Declaration.4
After describing the moral discourse and economic
considerations that led to the integration of IP provisions into the
WTO, this article examines the highly variegated moral discourse
leading up to the Doha Declaration. The objective of this article is
two-fold: first, to demonstrate the role of moral discourse in
shaping legal transformation; second, to demonstrate the variety of
moral arguments, in addition to those founded on human rights
with the post-World War II writings of Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, and
George Kennan, among others, and continues in the writings of "neo-realists"
such as Kenneth Waltz. See Jack Donnelly, Twentieth Century Realism, in
TRADITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 85 (Terry Nardin & David R. Maple
eds., 1992).
2 Realpolitik is a prescriptive guideline for policymaking that focuses on the
balance of power among nation states and works for realistic/practical
compromises instead of clinging to values like justice or nationalism.
Encyclopedia Britannica Online, http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article-
9376569?query=realpolitik&ct=.
3 WTO Agreement Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade
Negotiations, Sept. 1994, 33 U.N.T.S. 187.
4 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
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principles, which lead to the conclusion that citizens of poor
countries should have access to affordable HIV/AIDS drugs and
that pharmaceutical patents should be subjected to compulsory
licensing and parallel importing to accomplish this aim.
I
II. The Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations: How
Intellectual Property and International Trade Became
Interlinked
Beginning in the mid-1980s, a coalition of entertainment,
pharmaceutical, and software companies based primarily in the
United States (but cooperating with similarly situated companies
in Europe and Japan) waged a multi-faceted global lobbying effort
that eventually resulted in the introduction of IP protection into
what is now the WTO.5 Prior to the inception of the Uruguay
Round of global trade talks at Punte del Este in 1986, no one had
ever contemplated that IP rights in the form of patents, copyrights,
and trademarks would become a part of the world trading system.6
Previous global trade negotiations focused exclusively on reducing
tariff and non-tariff barriers.7 Existing international treaties-such
as the Paris Treaty and the Berne Convention-specifically
permitted signatory nations to adopt whatever IP laws they
wished, so long as those laws were applied in a non-discriminatory
manner to foreign and domestic actors.8 Similarly, Article XX (d)
5 Among the companies that formed this coalition were Pfizer, IBM, Merck,
General Electric, Du Pont, Time Warner, Hewlett-Packard, Bristol-Myers,
Johnson & Johnson, and Monsanto. See Lynn Sharp Paine & Michael A.
Santoro, Pfizer: Global Protection of Intellectual Property (Harvard Business
School, Case No. 9-392-073, 1995).
6 Id. at 10.
7 Id.
8 The Paris Convention (to which there were 101 signatories) specified the
conditions under which a contracting state could provide by law for compulsory
licensing or, in rare instances, the revocation of a patent (such as in the case of
an unjustified failure to work). As to matters not covered by the Convention,
each contracting state was free to legislate to, e.g., exclude certain fields of
technology, or fix the duration of patents. There were no specific enforcement
mechanisms or dispute resolution procedures under the Paris Convention. See
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Paris Convention,
Mar. 20, 1883, as revised at the Stockholm Conference, July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305; see also Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Work, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised July 24, 1971,
amended Oct. 2, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
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of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
specifically left the nature and extent of IP protection to the
discretion of contracting nations, provided that their laws were not
discriminatorily applied against other nations or otherwise in
conflict with GATT. 9
Many third world countries strongly resisted the very idea of
linking trading privileges with a country's adoption of a prescribed
IP regime, particularly in the case of pharmaceutical patents.
Typical of third world opinion was the view of a Latin American
Association of Pharmaceutical Industries official who argued that
strong IP protection was "not possible because of poor economic
conditions.... It is impossible for us to invest in research because
we have no resources, and it is very important for public
administrators to buy medicine for the social security system at
affordable prices."1°  Third world leaders also believed that a
WTO trade provision would violate their sovereign power to make
crucial health care decisions on behalf of their citizens."
The WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) 2 effected a significant transformation in
the existing international legal framework. It was also a major
victory for large multinational corporations based in the United
States, Europe, and Japan. Although there was a phase-in period
for less developed economies, TRIPS made, for the first time, a
member nation's right of export to other member states contingent
upon the adoption and enforcement of laws enforcing IP according
to a WTO-prescribed minimum standard. 3 Without a doubt, the
predominant factor leading to the WTO's adoption of the TRIPS
agreement was the irresistible economic pressure applied by rich
countries against poor countries. Arguably, however, moral
arguments about property rights and social benefits of EP
effectively complemented those pressure tactics.
9 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, art. XX (d) [hereinafter GATT].
10 Paine & Santoro, supra note 5, at 17.
1 Id.
12 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
'3 Id.
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Reeling from the manufacturing challenge from Japan in
the 1970s and 1980s the American-and to a certain extent
the European-economies were in the process of reinventing
themselves as driven by the entertainment, pharmaceutical, and
information technology industries. Global IP protection was an
indispensable part of this economic transformation. With timely
appreciation for the ascending importance of IP protection to
American companies, the U.S. Congress passed the Trade and
Tariff Act of 198414 and later the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988." Taken together, these statutes
authorized the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to
relegate countries that provide inadequate IP protection to U.S.
firms to Section 301.16
The USTR's activities and threats to deny access to U.S.
markets under Section 301 plainly violated Article XX(d) of the
GATT, which specifically allowed signatories to engage in the
very practices that Section 301 was addressing. 7 Not surprisingly,
the bullying tactics employed by the USTR engendered
widespread distaste and criticism from other nations. 8 Not even
close American allies were immune from the threat of unilateral
trade sanctions-in 1991, Europe and Australia wound up on the
"Priority Watch List."'19
The economic leverage applied through Section 301 worked.
Faced with the threat of having U.S. markets closed to them,
nations such as the Philippines, Panama, and Thailand negotiated
bilateral IP agreements with the United States.2" By the time the
14 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 98 Stat. 2948 (1984);
see also Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2101, 2242(1974); Trade and Tariff
Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1654 (1930).
15 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2901 (1988).
16 Under Section 301, countries are categorized, in increasing order of severity,
as "Watch List," "Priority Watch List," or "Priority Foreign Country." Paine &
Santoro, supra note 5, at 14.
17 GATT, supra note 9, art. XX(d).
18 See generally AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T.
Patrick eds., 1990).
19 Paine & Santoro, supra note 5, at 14.
20 Peter Drahos, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, tbl.1, http://www.make
tradefair.conassets/english/bilateralism.pdf (listing the countries which have
negotiated bilateral IP treaties with the United States).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
WTO came into existence on January 1, 1995, the cumulative
force of U.S. bargaining power and the threat of Section 301
sanctions proved to be extremely influential as TRIPS became part
of the WTO.2' Although there was a phase-in period for
adherence by countries with developing economies-and a
"national emergency" exception that would later prove to be the
toehold for important gains by third world countries-there can be
no denying that the very inclusion of an IP agreement in the WTO
represented a major tactical victory for multinational corporations
(MNCs).
MNCs offered two moral arguments to complement the
economic leverage made possible by Section 301. One was a
utilitarian argument based on the putative economic benefit of
adopting strong IP protection.22 MNCs argued that patents are not
only good for corporate profits, but also the adoption of strong
IP laws would help third world countries to develop their own
high technology industries and products in the same manner that
such laws spur innovations in developed countries. 23  The
pharmaceutical companies argued that third world leaders could
increase the welfare of their own citizens even-mirabile dictu-
as pharmaceutical companies gained higher profits.24  This
utilitarian/economic argument has sparked a debate among
economists that persists to this day about whether the adoption of
strong IP protection in less developed economies is a net gain for
those countries.
The other, and ultimately more influential, argument advanced
by the pharmaceutical industry was based on the view that patents
were the inventor's "natural right" or just reward for inventive
21 TRIPS, supra note 12.
22 Paine & Santoro, supra note 5.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Compare Susan E. Feinberg & Sumit K. Majumdar, Technology Spillovers
from Foreign Direct Investment in the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, 32 J.
INT'L J. Bus. STUD. 421 (2001) with Jean 0. Lanjouw, The Introduction of
Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India: 'Heartless Exploitation of the Poor
and Suffering'? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 6366, 1998)
(presenting contrasting views on whether the adoption of strong IP protection
by third world countries will in fact lead to higher levels of economic
development).
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26
activity. According to this view, often associated with the
seventeenth century English philosopher John Locke, the inventor
is entitled to exclusive property rights to an invention by virtue of
having labored to produce it. At the same time, others are morally
obliged to recognize the rights of inventors by not copying their
creative ideas without permission. Perhaps the most telling
indicia of how successful the pharmaceutical companies were in
advancing this argument is the highly charged moral language that
is now commonly used to describe situations when pharmaceutical
products are not accorded strong IP protection. For example,
companies manufacturing pharmaceutical products protected by a
patent in the United States in countries without the appropriate
license are said to be engaged in "piracy" and "stealing., 2 8 When
Arthur Dunkel, then Secretary-General of GATT, expressed
concern about the importance of access to health care in
developing countries, the high cost of drugs, and the sovereignty
of nations to regulate costs and access to drugs, one
pharmaceutical industry executive responded as follows: "I asked
him to consider whether stealing drugs was any more acceptable
than stealing food. We certainly don't condone stealing food as a
means of dealing with the hunger problem.,
29
While the powerful economic leverage employed by U.S. trade
negotiators constituted the main reason that TRIPS made it into
the WTO, this pressure was very subtly, but crucially, enhanced
by the utilitarian and Lockean arguments advanced by
pharmaceutical executives. When the Doha Declaration was
adopted six years later, third world leaders and AIDS activists
were able to marshal their own persuasive moral arguments to
effect another significant transformation of the international IP
legal regime.3 °
III. The Doha Declaration
In November 2001, a WTO Ministerial Conference issued a
26 See Paine & Santoro, supra note 5, at 5.
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., Robert Goldberg, Stealing U.S. Drug Patents, WASH. TIMES, June
27, 2005 (using terms like "piracy" and "stealing" in reference to IP).
29 Paine & Santoro, supra note 5, at 13.
30 Doha Declaration, supra note 4.
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declaration (the "Doha Declaration") which proclaimed a simple
but important victory for AIDS activists and third world nations.3,
The Doha Declaration underscored and clarified the sovereign
power of third world countries to use the flexibility already built
into the TRIPS Agreement.3 2 The ministers also agreed to extend
exemptions for pharmaceutical patent protection for poor third
world countries until 2016.33
While re-iterating the commitment of member countries to the
WTO's IP regime, the Doha Declaration provided that "each
member has the right to determine what constitutes a national
emergency . . . it being understood that public health crises,
including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and
other epidemics, can represent a national emergency., 34 In effect,
this meant that third world nations could determine for themselves
when a national health emergency existed. Moreover, during such
emergencies nations would retain "the right to grant compulsory
licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which
such licenses are granted., 35
The Doha Declaration left open the question of parallel
imports.36 Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement provides that
products made under compulsory licensing must be "predominantly
for the supply of the domestic market., 37 As a result, the very few
third world countries, such as Brazil and India, that possess the
capacity to manufacture drugs were limited by TRIPS in the
volume of drugs they could export to other third world countries.38
The vast majority of third world countries do not have the
industrial capacity to manufacture drugs even if they were to
invoke the compulsory licensing contemplated by the Doha
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. para. 7.
34 Id. para. 5, subpara. c.
35 Id. para. 5, subpara. b.
36 See generally id. (making no mention of parallel imports in the Declaration).
37 TRIPS, supra note 12, art. 31(f).
38 See generally Decision, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/I1540 (Sept. 1,
2003).
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Declaration.39 In August 2003, WTO members agreed to make it
easier for countries that could not themselves manufacture drugs
to import cheaper generics manufactured under compulsory
licenses in countries such as India and Brazil.4 °
How do we account for the sea change in attitudes about
intellectual property that occurred between 1995 and 2001? First
and foremost, it is important to note that during this period of time
the magnitude of the AIDS pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa and
other parts of the third world first impressed itself fully on the
global consciousness. Moreover, AIDS activists and third world
leaders brought a highly focused and effective IP lobbying effort
to bear upon the Doha meetings.
As far as the developed world was concerned IP issues were
not at the forefront of their priorities. By 2001, Europe and Japan
were concerned with maintaining agricultural subsidies and
promoting environmental initiatives. In the United States, the
steel industry mounted a strong internal lobbying effort and thus
the USTR was concerned with maintaining the anti-dumping
protections used to protect the industry. Moreover, because the
preceding WTO ministerial meetings in Seattle fell apart amidst
sometimes violent street protests claiming that the global trading
system unduly favored rich nations, the trade ministers in Doha
were determined to put trade negotiations back on a forward
track." It was from the wholesale horse trading on these diverse
issues that the Doha Declaration emerged. In sum, while the
developed countries were principally preoccupied with other
concerns, third world countries and AIDS activists were highly
focused on the issue of pharmaceutical patents-although
expansion of textile export quotas was also high on the agenda of
third world countries. As Egyptian trade minister Youssef
Boutros-Gali commented on the compulsory licensing issue, "rich
countries knew the only way they would get anything was if they
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See Geoff Winestock & Helene Cooper, WTO Envoys Agree to EASE Access
to Key Drugs-Public Health Outweighs Patents as Deal Paves Way for
Broader Trade Talks, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2001, at A17.
42 Id.
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gave in on this."43
The efforts of third world nations to achieve greater latitude on
compulsory licensing were emboldened by the anthrax scare of
2001. 44 Faced with the threat of letter-born anthrax attacks in the
United States, Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy
Thompson threatened to break the patent rights of Bayer, the
German manufacturer of the anthrax antidote Cipro 5 Leaders
from developing countries could not resist pointing out the
irony-or perhaps better said, hypocrisy-that the United States
was willing to break a patent when it had suffered a handful of
deaths while denying the same flexibility to third world countries
where tens of millions of people suffered from HIV/AIDS and
other diseases.46
It is fair to say that while the initial TRIPS agreement was a
product primarily of Realpolitik economic leverage complemented
by moral arguments, the Doha Declaration represented the
converse. Lacking the economic leverage of rich countries, third
world countries were able to achieve their goals by relying on
compelling moral arguments coupled with effective strategic focus
and bargaining tactics. But exactly what moral principle did the
Doha Declaration uphold? Was the Declaration an affirmation or
foreshadowing of a human right to health care in general and to
drugs in particular? Or might the justification of the Doha
Declaration hinge on some alternative moral precept?
IV. Rights, Needs, and Supererogatory Duties: Alternative
Paths to Moral Betterment
The Doha Declaration represents moral progress of the highest
order. The principles enunciated therein helped to ameliorate a
formidable obstacle-that is, high prices due to pharmaceutical
patents-preventing millions suffering from H1V/AIDS in the
third world from obtaining access to life-saving and life-enhancing
43 Id.
44 See Rachel Zimmerman & Geoff Winestock, Questions of Security:
Developing Nations Emboldened by U.S. in Drug Demands, WALL ST. J., Oct.
26, 2001, at A6.
45 Id.
46 Winestock & Cooper, supra note 41.
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drugs.47 To be sure, many obstacles still practically thwart access
to these drugs, including inadequate distribution systems and a
shortage of trained medical professionals and technicians.48
Moreover, many poor countries cannot afford to pay for
HIV/AIDS drugs even at reduced prices.4 9 Responding to this
tragedy of global proportions, many private, public, and non-
governmental organizations have provided funding and technical
resources to help meet these challenges and make access to
antiretroviral drugs a reality for citizens of poor countries.5 °
How can we characterize the moral sentiments that lead to
such human betterment? There is great temptation, particularly
among lawyers, to regard the Doha Declaration as a harbinger of
an emerging human right to health care generally and to
pharmaceuticals in particular. There is indeed some basis for
viewing the Doha Declaration in this light. However, there are
moral claims other than those emanating from human rights for
achieving human betterment. If one examines the discussion and
debate that occurred before and after the Doha Declaration, it
becomes evident that the power of these other moral ideas
contributed as surely as the power of the idea of human rights to
establish the principle that citizens of third world countries should
have affordable access to antiretrovirals.
V. Supererogatory Acts
A supererogatory act is one where an action goes beyond the
47 See World Trade Organization, Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, Nov. 20, 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002); see
also James T. Gathii, Third World Perspectives on Global Pharmaceutical
Access, in ETHICS AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 336 (Michael A.
Santoro & Thomas M. Gorrie eds., 2005); Judy Rein, International Governance
Through Trade Agreement: Patent Protections for Essential Medicines, 21 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 379 (2001); Zita Lazzarini, Making Access to
Pharmaceuticals a Reality: Legal Options under TRIPS and the Case of Brazil,
6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 103 (2003); J.M. Spectar, Patent Necessity:
Intellectual Property Dilemmas in the Biotech Domain & Treatment of Equity
for Developing Countries, 24 Hous. J. INT'L L. 227 (2002).
48 Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs
Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1886,
1890 (2001).
49 Compare id. with Gathii, supra note 47.
50 See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
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demands of duty.5 The performance of supererogatory acts
properly deserves praise.52 However, a person does not deserve
blame for not performing such acts. For instance, heroic acts of
valor fall in this category.53 It should be pointed out that some
philosophers do not admit the existence of supererogatory acts.54
For example, strict act-utilitarians believe that it is impossible to
perform acts that exceed the demands of duty.55 Other moral
philosophers believe that what some call supererogatory acts
involving aid to others are merely instances of what Kant refers to
as imperfect duties. 56  For Kant, imperfect duties are always
imperfectly satisfied because we must select which ones to
perform, and we have some discretion as to how much we should
do to help someone.57 Nonetheless, for Kantians, imperfect duties
are still duties.58
Despite the controversial nature of supererogation in
philosophical circles, many private, public, and non-governmental
actors in the global arena would certainly wish to characterize
their own actions as charitable examples of supererogation. After
the principles of the Doha Declaration went into effect, a number
of pharmaceutical companies have not merely passively watched
as generic companies subject their patents to compulsory
licensing. Some companies, both within and outside of the
pharmaceutical industry, have taken significant action to address
the health care crisis caused by the AIDS pandemic. A good
example is Merck's participation in the Masa ("New Dawn")
program of the African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership
(ACHAP).59 ACHAP is a public-private partnership among the
51 See DAVID HEYD, SUPEREROGATION: ITS STATUS IN ETHICAL THEORY, at 1-11
(1982).
52 Id. at 7.
53 Id. at2.
54 Id. at 3.
55 Id. at 3.
56 Id. at 62-65.
57 HEYD, supra note 51, at 62-64.
58 Compare id. with MARCIA W. BARON, KANTIAN ETHICS ALMOST WITHOUT
APOLOGY (1995) (presenting two views of the possibility of supererogatory
duties).
59 See generally Joan Stephenson, "New Dawn" for Botswana: Offering Free
HIV Treatment-and Hope, 292 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2565 (2004) (interviewing
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Republic of Botswana, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,
and the Merck Foundation. 60 Thanks in part to ACHAP, Botswana
became the first African nation to implement widespread
distribution of antiretroviral drugs through its public health
61
system. Pfizer has made substantial free donations of its
antifungal medicine Diflucan® (fluconazole) for the treatment of
opportunistic infections associated with HIV infection.62
Additionally, Coca-Cola, working with the Global Business
Coalition, extended antiretroviral therapy benefits to employees of
all of its forty bottlers in Africa.63
The putative existence of supererogatory acts does not imply
that there are no moral minimums. However, sometimes moral
progress and human betterment occur because people and
companies go beyond what is required of them by duty and
become moral leaders. We want to leave room in our moral
language and our moral sentiments to capture this notion. Our
ability and willingness to praise companies and individuals that go
beyond the fulfillment of minimum duties can be an integral part
of a complete moral system that provides solutions for global
social problems such as the AIDS pandemic.
VI. Needs, Distributive Justice, and the Duty of Rescue
The United States has worked intensively to find a solution that
will provide life-saving drugs to those truly in need, and will
continue to work towards that end. We urge others to join us..
• to help poor countries get access to emergency life-saving
Ernest Darkoh, MD, MPH, who oversees Masa, a critical component of the
African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnerships in Botswana).
60 For more information about ACHAP, see Merck, Annual Report 2000,
http://www.anrpt2000.com/access4.htm. See also Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation, Global Health, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/GlobalHealth/
(highlighting the work of the foundation).
61 Merck, supra note 60; Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, supra note 60.
62 Pfizer, A Prescription for Access: How the World's Leading Pharmaceutical
Company is Promoting Access to Medicines in Developing Countries, Spring
2004,http://www.pfizer.compfizer/subsites/philanthropy/access/access-spring_
2004.pdf.
63 Press Release, Global Business Coalition, GBC Applauds Coca-Cola
Leadership in Extending HIV Healthcare Benefits to its African Bottlers (Sept.
30, 2002), http://www.businessfightsaids.org/site/apps/nl/content2.asp?c=
gwKXJfNVJtF&b= 1 008909&ct= 1366003.
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drugs.
-Robert Zoellick, U.S. Trade Representative
64
The public has a position on this issue: poor people need those
drugs. The need is to deliver affordable drugs in the most
efficient way to the poorest of the poor. If we don't resolve this,
the WT. O. will be judged very harshly.
-Sergio Marchi, Canadian Trade Representative
65
Another alternative to conceiving of access to HIV/AIDS
drugs as a right is to regard such access as a basic human need that
under certain conditions would justify and indeed morally require
others to act. Fundamentally, the moral obligation to act when
others are in need is rooted in utilitarianism.66 Peter Singer, in his
classic essay "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," argued that
individuals should donate money to alleviate global poverty on the
grounds that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from
happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable
moral importance, we ought morally to do it."
67
Sometimes referred to as the "duty of rescue," needs-centered
theory depends on two utilitarian premises.68 One premise is that
"the more profound the need, the more evident the directness and
immediacy of needs in activating moral agency will be., 69 It is
difficult to imagine a more pressing or significant human need
than that of persons suffering from HIV/AIDS. A second premise
of the duty of rescue is that the cost to the rescuer or others must
64 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Announces Interim HIV/AIDS Plan
for Poor Countries-Measure Taken in Absence of WTO Consensus on
Intellectual Property (Dec. 23, 2002),
http:llusinfo.state.govlei/Archivel2003Dec/31 -901735.html.
65 Elizabeth Olson, Global Trade Negotiations Are Making Little Progress,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2002, at C3.
66 Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 229,
231 (1972)
67 Id.; see also T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998)
(presenting the contractualist view that thinking about right and wrong is
thinking about what we do in terms that could be justified to others and what
they could not reasonably reject).
68 See, e.g., GARRETr THOMSON, NEEDS (1987).
69 Gillian Brock & Soran Reader, Needs-Centered Ethical Theory, 36 J. VALUE
INQUIRY 425, 426 (2002).
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not be so great as to (in the extreme case) outweigh the benefit to
the person being rescued.70  The less burdensome it is for the
rescuer and the greater the benefit to the person being rescued, the
more compelling is the obligation to act.7'
Applying the duty of rescue to drugs, Nien-h Hsieh has
argued that pharmaceutical companies are in a position to help
those suffering from HIV/AIDS by relaxing their patents to allow
for production of generics by rival firms, by reducing prices, and
in some cases by donating drugs for free.72 Hsieh argues that all
this can be accomplished without fundamentally altering the
property rights of pharmaceutical companies.73 This is critical to
the application of the rescue theory in two respects: (1) it suggests
that the financial costs to the pharmaceutical companies are
reasonable given the benefits produced for those who suffer from
HIV/AIDS, and (2) it ensures that applying the duty of rescue to
HIV/AIDS patients Will not result in diminished innovation to
serve others persons who in the future might suffer from as yet
unknown pandemics.74
If one examines the discourse surrounding the Doha
Declaration, needs-based moral reasoning figures prominently.
Consider the view of Daniel Berman on behalf of Mdecins Sans
Fronti~res: "The victory in Doha is really for people who need or
will need access to life-saving or extending medicines."75 Richard
70 THOMSON, supra note 68.
71 The classic example is the duty to rescue a small child in shallow water.
Here, the benefit to the child is great, the risk and inconvenience to the rescuer
slight by comparison. If the waters are deep, the ebb tide strong and the
drowning person is large and flailing about desperately, the duty of rescue
becomes less compelling.
72 Nien-h8 Hsieh, Property Rights in Crisis: Managers and Crisis, in Santoro
& Gorrie, supra note 47, at 379.
73 Id.
74 Id. Compare Sidney Taurel, The Campaign Against Innovation, in Santoro
& Gorrie, supra note 48 (the CEO of a major pharmaceutical company writing
to defend the connection between pharmaceutical patents and innovation), with
Patricia H. Werhane & Michael E. Gorman, Intellectual Property Rights, Access
to Life enhancing Drugs, and Corporate Moral Responsibility, in Santoro &
Gorrie, supra note 48 (arguing for a weakening of patent rights on the grounds
that discoveries are based on "networks" of knowledge).
75 Daniel Berman, MSF Reactions to Doha TRIPS Agreement, MSF, Nov. 15,
2001,
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Elliot, a spokesman for a consortium of activist groups added that
"[a]llowing developing countries to put reasonable limits on the
patent rights of pharmaceutical companies (which already has the
highest profit margins of any industry) will have little impact on
overall company profits or on research and development. 7
6
Finally, consider a funding proposal made by Zackie Achmat
of the South African Treatment Action Campaign to the 14th
International AIDS Conference in Barcelona in July 2002:
To be able to deliver drugs to people, to be able to save the lives
of the millions with HIV and AIDS, we need effective public
health care systems. We can only start by endorsing ... [the
view] .. .that regards health care as an essential public good.
Not just an essential public good, but an absolute essential
not only for dignity and life but as a component of a
sustainable development strategy for most developing countries.
We therefore endorse the request for additional funding for
health care systems across the globe by the World Health
Organization to ensure that public health care systems are
effective and that they deal with HIV and AIDS, with TB, with
malaria and with all the diseases of poor people.77
As the foregoing statements illustrate, powerful moral claims
can be asserted on the basis of need. Moral arguments routinely
appeal to considerations of need as an explanation and justification
for action. In the discourse surrounding the Doha Declaration,
appeals based on need and the duty of rescue offered moral weight
to the principle that pharmaceutical patents should be relaxed to
enable citizens of poor third world countries to obtain affordable
access to HIV/AIDS drugs.
http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?component=article&objectid=
F19A902E-9620-49A5-83AED5EAE 1AF3246&method=fullhtml.
76 Richard Elliott, Toronto Star & Le Devoir: WTO Needs Reminding We All
Deserve Health Care, Nov. 11, 2001, http://www.accessmed-
msf.org/prod/publications.asp?scntid=121120011440332&contenttype=PARA
77 Zachie Achmat, Message from Zackie Achmat-Treatment Action
Campaign (South Africe) to the 14th International AIDS Conference-
Barcelona (July 10, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.tac.org.za (select
"Documents" link, then "Other Documents," then "Transcript (Word
Document) of Zackie Achmat's Barcelona speech (which was delivered via
video)")).
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VII.The Human Right to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services.
-Article 25, Universal Declaration of Human Rights7 8
At this point in the analysis, lawyers might understandably be
impatient with all this talk about moral persuasion. For a lawyer,
the best way to assure an outcome is through rights and correlative
duties. Speak all you want of a person's needs, many lawyers
might say, but to call something a right is the most powerful kind
of moral claim one can make. If that moral claim can be
transformed into a legal claim with corresponding legal duties,
then one really has something. Even on the moral, hortatory plane
that human rights occupy, many lawyers would argue that
speaking in "rights talk" (as Mary Ann Glendon not altogether
approvingly terms it)79 is more compelling than speaking about
human needs. For example, Jeremy Waldron has written: "Both
rights and needs amount to a demand that certain interests be
attended to; but only rights-talk presents those interests in the
voice of one who would be a full-fledged member of society, who
is not going away, and who expects to be taken seriously as an
enduring source of continuing demands. 80
Undeniably, some of the most powerful and persuasive moral
rhetoric surrounding the Doha Declaration casts the issue of access
to HIV/AIDS drugs under the mantle of human rights. Consider
the moving words of Milly Katana of the Ugandan Health Rights
Action Group:
We are angry. Our people are dying. We can no longer accept
millions of needless AIDS deaths simply because we are poor
78 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
http://www.un.org/Overview/ights.html.
79 See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991) (tracing the evolution of the language of rights in
America and arguing that the political tendency to frame issues in terms of
individual rights impedes understanding and compromise, resulting in coerced
and unsatisfying social arrangements).
80 Jeremy Waldron, The Role of Rights in Practical Reasoning: "Rights"
Versus "Needs," 4J. ETHICS 115, 131 (2000).
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Africans. We know antiretroviral (ARV) treatment is feasible in
our countries and are launching a movement to demand ARV
treatment that won't take no for an answer.... We want to make
sure that policy makers and international agencies have the issue
of treatment on their agenda and look at it from the human rights
81perspective.
Any right to pharmaceuticals must, of course, derive from a
more general right to health care. The human right to health is
enunciated, among other places, in Article 25 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.82 But what is the moral source of
this right? Some philosophers have attempted to bootstrap the
right to health care onto John Rawls's theory of distributive
justice.8' According to Norman Daniels, for example, since
disease impairs normal human functioning, it restricts a person's
range of opportunities to pursue a career.84 By preventing, curing,
or ameliorating disease, therefore, adequate health care helps to
guarantee fair equality of opportunity. Unlike negative rights
that require the duty holder simply to forbear from interfering with
the right holder, positive rights (such as the right to health care)
require someone to act for, or provide something to, the right
holder. This, in turn, raises the question of who exactly has a duty
to honor the human right to drugs.
In the case of the duty to make HIV/AIDS drugs
available to poor citizens of the third world, there is an
understandable tendency to point the finger squarely at the
81 Sustainable Africa, African Activists Unite Against HIV/Aids, ALL AFRICA,
Oct. 4, 2002, http://allafrica.com/sustainable/stories/200210040165.html
82 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 25, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
83 See JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
84 Norman Daniels, Health Care Needs and Distributive Justice, 10 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 146, 158-59 (1981).
85 Id. at 160; see also John C. Moskop, Rawlsian Justice and a Human Right to
Health Care, 8 J. MED. & PHIL. 329 (1983). In later writings, Daniels became
concerned with the question of how governments and health maintenance
organizations with limited resources should allocate scarce resources among
competing health priorities. See Norman Daniels et al., Who Should Get Access
to Which Drugs? An Ethical Template for Pharmacy Benefits, in Santoro &
Gorrie, supra note 48, at 206; see also Joel Hay, The Application of Cost-
Effectiveness and Cost-Benefit Analysis to Pharmaceuticals, in Santoro &
Gorrie, supra note 47, at 225.
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pharmaceutical industry. However, the pharmaceutical industry is
not solely responsible as many other global actors, including
national governments, non-governmental and intergovernmental
organizations, and others share collective responsibility.8 6  It is
only through the cooperative efforts of many actors with diverse
capacities that we can hope to make a significant impact on the
complex global problem posed by the AIDS pandemic. As Dr.
Bill Foege, a longtime leader in global health campaigns and most
recently a medical director for the Gates Foundation, has
commented:
[L]eadership is no longer the result of someone having a title,
but rather leadership goes to that person who develops an
effective coalition .... Not one of us is as powerful as all of us
in improving the health of the world. To improve global health
by effectively controlling AIDS requires us to develop seamless
cooperation between public and private efforts.87
Despite the conceptual and practical issues inherent in any
positive human right, defining HIV/AIDS drug access as a human
right issue taps into a profound moral reservoir. In the case of the
Doha Declaration, there is no doubt that invoking human rights
gave powerful voice to the suffering of millions of poor and
disenfranchised people. If the foundation of human rights is a
moral ideal, then it would be a hollow ideal if there were not room
in it to give dignity and hope to those suffering from the scourge
of AIDS.
86 One aspect of the question of who owes a duty is how to allocate such duties
when multiple parties might be said to bear some responsibility. For an analysis
of how corporate social responsibility is affected by the existence of other
responsible public and non-public actors with duties, see MICHAEL A. SANTORO,
PROFITS AND PRINCIPLES: GLOBAL CAPITALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA
(2000) (describing the "Fair Share Theory of Corporate Responsibility"). See
also Claire Dickerson, Human Rights: the Emerging Norm of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1431 (2002); COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY: FIVE
DECADES OF DEBATE IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ETHICS (Larry May &
Stacey Hoffmann eds., 1991) (presenting philosophical analyses of moral,
political, and legal responsibility of groups and their members).
87 William H. Foege, Blurring the Lines: Public and Private Partnerships
Addressing Global Health, in Santoro & Gorrie, supra note 48, at 386. For a
pharmaceutical industry perspective on public-private partnerships, see Thomas
M. Gorrie, Evolving Approaches to Health Care Challenges, in Santoro &
Gorrie, supra note 47, at 369.
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VIII.Conclusion
This article has attempted to demonstrate two propositions.
The first objective of this article has been to show the power of
moral discourse to affect the transformation of international trade
law. In the case of the inclusion of the TRIPS Agreement during
the founding of the WTO, moral discourse played a
complementary role to Realpolitik economic leverage.
Introducing such language as "stealing" and "piracy" into the IP
debate helped the pharmaceutical industry to change the global
perception of the moral and economic status of P and thereby
contributed to the enactment of the TRIPS Agreement. In the case
of the Doha Declaration, however, moral discourse played a more
prominent role and helped relatively weak third world countries
and AIDS activists to obtain important concessions on relaxing
patents in times of national emergencies and on parallel importing
issues.
A second objective of this article has been to demonstrate that
the appeal to human rights is not the only form of moral discourse
that can lead one to the view that poor citizens of third world
countries should have affordable access to AIDS/HIV drugs.
While there is great moral power to human rights, there is also
great power in other forms of discourse. For example, utilitarian
principles such as the theory of rescue and even the
philosophically controversial notion of supererogatory acts have
also proven to be morally persuasive. As demonstrated by the
power of the moral discourse that helped engender the Doha
Declaration, an appeal to human rights is not the only way to
inspire decisive action and achieve human betterment.
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